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Abstract
I propose an account of generous action in the Pāli Buddhist tradition, whereby 
generous actions are instances of giving in which the donor has esteem for the recipient 
of their giving. The account differs from recent Anglophone accounts of generous action. 
These tend to construe generous actions as instances of a donor freely offering a gift 
to the recipient for the sake of benefiting the recipient. Unlike the Buddhist account I 
propose, these accounts do not require donors to esteem their recipient. Accordingly, I 
also offer a partial account of esteem, whereby one esteems another only if they refrain 
from noticing the other’s faults and they encounter the other as someone who is superior 
in virtue and goodness. Taken together, the Buddhist accounts of generous action and 
esteem offer insight into certain ways in which different philosophical traditions tend to 
characterize generous action.
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Introduction
Generosity marks the beginnings of Buddhism. In the Discourse About Kassapa 
(Kassapa Sutta, Ud 3.7), Mahākassapa, one of the Buddha’s first disciples, is 
recovering from an illness. During a walk to collect alms, he encounters 
a weaver. The weaver has been searching for Mahākassapa. Upon guiding 
the monk to his home, the weaver offers a bowl filled with curried rice. 
Mahākassapa, discerning that the weaver is an embodiment of the mighty 
god Indra, and having refused alms from lesser gods earlier in the morning, 
requests that Indra abstain from giving future offerings. Indra replies that even 
the gods have a duty (P. karaṇīya) to make merit (P. puñña).1 Then, after praising 
the monk and beginning his ascent to his heavenly abode, Indra declares that 
Mahākassapa is the best recipient for giving (Ireland 1997, 44–45).
Early Vedic tradition depicts Indra as the origin and sustenance of all 
things (Rig Veda 2.12.7; recited from Perry 1885, 182). Following Indra’s demotion 
in subsequent Vedic tradition, Buddhist tradition effectively adopts Indra as 
a divine disciple of the Buddha. For example, the Discourse on the Grounds of 
Merit-Making (Puññakiriyavatthu Sutta, AN 8.36) depicts Indra as a convert 
to Buddhist teaching who excels in meritorious giving (Bodhi 2012, 1171). 
Citing as evidence some instructions about giving that the Buddha offers to 
Indra, Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu) concludes that giving to the saṅgha 
(Buddhist community) is exceptionally meritorious (Kathāvatthu 17.9; recited from 
Aung and Rhys Davids 1915, 320–321). Assuming that Indra takes the Buddha’s 
instructions to heart, a likely basis for Indra’s esteem toward Mahākassapa is 
Mahākassapa’s instrumental role in helping to establish the saṅgha. 
The Discourse About Kassapa positions generous action as a foundation for 
a Buddhist community. This is an intelligible position, insofar as Buddhist 
monks take a vow of poverty. Alms-giving sustains the monastic community. 
Indra’s remark about having a duty to make merit is somewhat less intelligible. 
Contemporary Anglophone philosophical assessments of generosity tend to 
agree that generous action is supererogatory, good but not obligatory (see Hunt 
1975, 239; Miller 2018, 227). They tend to agree, as well, that actions are generous 
only when their primary motive is altruistic, directed toward benefitting the 
recipient for their own sake and without an expectation of personal benefit 
to the giver (see Hunt 1975, 239; Miller 2018, 225). Indra’s remark seems to 
violate both of these constraints on generous action. Yet Indra’s alms-giving to 
198  International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture 30(2) · 2020 JONES • An Account of Generous Action and Esteem in Pāli Buddhism  199 
Mahākassapa is a paradigm of generous action in the Buddhist tradition.
A successful account of generous action in the Buddhist tradition should 
explain why generous actions have the characteristics Buddhist tradition 
ascribes to them. The account should identify a relatively sparse collection of 
conditions on generous action, from which the characteristics of generous 
actions are derivable, and for which there is textual support from the Buddhist 
tradition. The conditions should help in distinguishing generous actions from 
other acts of exchange such as barter, charity, and justice. They also should help 
with identifying anything that is distinctive about the Buddhist approach in 
conceptualizing generous action, in comparison with approaches from other, 
non-Buddhist traditions. 
Despite its centrality to Buddhist community, no such account is explicit 
in Buddhist discourses, treatises, or commentaries. I propose, accordingly, to 
develop an account of generous action in the Buddhist tradition. The account 
engages with recent interest shown in generosity by sociologists and analytic 
philosophers (see Herzog and Price 2016; Miller 2018). It also complements more 
general examinations of virtue in Buddhist ethics (such as Keown 1992; Wright 
2009; Goodman 2015; MacKenzie 2018). I focus on generous action rather than 
generosity, or the disposition toward generous action (P. cāga), because this 
focus helps “to pave the way to developing an account of the virtuous character 
dispositions that are capable of giving rise to such acts” (Miller 2018, 217). 
Moreover, because the Buddhist tradition is long and diverse, I focus on the 
conception of generous action that appears in the various scriptural collections 
(P. nikāyas) of the early Pāli canon—albeit with some occasional reference to 
later or less canonical works. For the sake of expository convenience, I thereby 
refer to the proposed account of generous action as an account of generous 
action in the Pāli Buddhist tradition. 
Conditions of Generous Action
I propose that generous actions in the Pāli Buddhist tradition are instances 
of giving in which the donor has esteem for the recipient of their giving. I 
elaborate upon this proposal in this section by dividing it into two conditions 
on generous action, with textual evidence from the Pāli Buddhist tradition for 
each condition, and developing a partial analysis of the second (esteem-based) 
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condition. In subsequent sections, I use the proposal to explain the value of 
generous action, examine its implications for teachings about merit and no-
self, and highlight differences with accounts of generous action from other 
traditions.
The account I propose contains two fundamental conditions. The first is 
labelled the Giving Constraint.
Giving Constraint: All generous actions involve giving (P./Skt. dāna; Ch. bushi 
布施).
According to the Discourse on Giving (Dāna Sutta, AN 7.49) in The Buddha’s 
Sayings (Itivuttaka 98), that which is given may be material or soteriological. 
Bhikkhus, there are these two kinds of giving: the giving of material things and 
the giving of the Dhamma. (Ireland 1997, 192)
Indra’s offering of rice exemplifies giving of the material; the Buddha’s 
instruction to Indra, giving of the soteriological. Whatever the offering, 
generous action always involves some transfer from a donor to a recipient. 
The best confirmation for the Giving Constraint on generous action, however, 
is linguistic rather than textual: the standard Buddhist term for denoting 
generous action means giving.
Despite the intimate connection between generous action and giving, the 
Pāli Buddhist tradition tends to restrict generous actions to only certain sorts 
of giving. The relevant restrictions support a second condition on generous 
action. The second condition is labelled the Esteem Constraint.
Esteem Constraint: All generous actions involve the donor having esteem (P. 
saddhā́; Skt. śraddhā́; Ch. xin 信) for the recipient.
The term esteem denotes an attitude of trust and confidence. Esteeming 
someone, in a Buddhist sense, means encountering them as worthy of one’s 
efforts.2  
According to the Discourse About Velāma (Velāma Sutta, AN 9.20), giving 
attentively—viewing the recipient of giving as someone on whom one’s efforts 
are likely to bear fruit—is superior to giving inattentively, viewing the recipient 
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of giving as someone on whom one’s efforts are likely to be wasted. 
Are alms given in your family, householder?
Alms are given in my family, [Venerable Sir], but they consist of broken rice 
accompanied by gruel.
If, householder, one gives alms, coarse or excellent, and one gives 
disrespectfully, gives inconsiderately, does not give with one’s own hand, 
gives what would be discarded, gives without a view of future consequences, 
then wherever the result of that gift is produced for one, one’s mind does not 
incline toward the enjoyment of superb food, nor toward the enjoyment of 
superb clothing, nor toward the enjoyment of superb vehicles, nor toward the 
enjoyment of whatever is superb among the five objects of sensual pleasure. 
Also, one’s children and wives, and one’s slaves, servants, and workers, do not 
want to listen to one, do not lend an ear, and do not apply their minds to 
understand….
If, householder, one gives alms, whether coarse or excellent, and one gives 
respectfully, gives considerately, gives with one’s own hand, gives what would 
not be discarded, gives with a view of future consequences, then wherever the 
result of that gift is produced for one, one’s mind inclines toward the enjoyment 
of superb food, toward the enjoyment of superb clothing, toward the enjoyment 
of superb vehicles, toward the enjoyment of whatever is superb among the 
five objects of sensual pleasure. Also, one’s children and wives, and one’s slaves, 
servants, and workers, want to listen to one, lend an ear, and apply their minds 
to understand. (Bodhi 2012, 1274–1275)
The Esteem Constraint enshrines this superiority as the difference between 
giving that is generous and giving that is not. The constraint entails that, 
even if a donor gives to a recipient who is (objectively) worthy of esteem, the 
donor’s giving is not generous unless the donor (subjectively) has esteem for 
the recipient. The constraint entails, as well, that giving to a recipient who 
is (objectively) unworthy of esteem does not preclude the giving from being 
generous.
The Esteem Constraint indicates that the donor’s attitudes toward the 
recipients of giving determine whether instances of giving are generous. Two 
such attitudes are especially noteworthy as constraints on esteem. The first is 
Subjective Superiority.
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Subjective Superiority: An individual has esteem toward someone only if the 
individual (subjectively) encounters that someone as (objectively) superior in 
virtue and goodness.3
The Discourse on the Sick Person’s Insight (Gilāna-dassana Sutta, SN 41.10) illustrates 
Subjective Superiority. On the verge of death, the exemplary layperson Citta 
instructs his family to give everything available for donation, without reservation, 
to those who are virtuous (P. sīlavant) and good (P. kalyāṇa).   
Whatever there may be in our family that can be given away, all that we will 
share unreservedly with the virtuous ones who are of good character. (Bodhi 
2000b, 1331)
Virtuous and good individuals are worthy recipients (P. suppata). Their virtue 
and goodness incline them to use donations to good purpose. Since donations 
used to good purpose bear fruit, Subjective Superiority thereby explains why 
generous actions are directed toward the benefit of others.
Subjective Superiority admits comparative and categorical interpretations. 
On the comparative interpretation, when a donor encounters an individual 
as superior in virtue and goodness, the donor ranks the individual as more 
virtuous or good in comparison to the donor. On the categorical interpretation, 
by contrast, when a donor encounters an individual as superior in virtue and 
goodness, the donor judges the individual to qualify as virtuous or good, 
regardless of whether the individual is superior to the donor in virtue or 
goodness. (The difference between these interpretations is akin to the difference 
between judging someone to be wealthy because their ownings exceed one’s own and 
judging someone to be wealthy because their ownings exceed some baseline standard 
for wealth.) 
The Pāli Buddhist tradition is fairly neutral between these interpretations. 
The parable of Citta’s generosity, in the Discourse on the Sick Person’s Insight, 
presents Citta as someone who is virtuous and good, and it presents the 
intended recipients of his posthumous generosity—the Buddha and the 
saṅgha—as more virtuous and good than Citta. The Discourse on Eight 
Individuals (Pathama Atthapuggala Sutta, AN 8.59) identifies eight classes of 
worthy individuals, ranging from the stream-entrant (P. sotāpanna) at the 
beginning of Buddhist discipleship to the arahant at the end. 
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Bhikkhus; these eight persons are worthy of gifts, worthy of hospitality, worthy 
of offerings, worthy of reverential salutation, an unsurpassed field of merit for 
the world. What eight? The stream-enterer, the one practicing for realization of 
the fruit of stream-entry; the once-returner, the one practicing for realization of 
the fruit of once-returning; the non-returner, the one practicing for realization 
of the fruit of non-returning; the arahant, the one practicing for realization of 
the fruit of arahantship. (Bodhi 2012, 1199)
The Pāli Buddhist tradition, however, does not limit worthy recipients to 
Buddhist monks and nuns. The Discourse to Vaccha (Vaccha Sutta, AN 3.57) 
declares that even stray animals qualify as worthy (see Bodhi 2012, 255). 
Similarly, in the Tale of the Hungry Tigress (Vyāghrī-jātaka), a young prince—
an incarnation of the Buddha—offers his body to sate a tigress on the verge of 
starvation (Ohnuma 2007, 278–80). None of these individuals qualifies as vicious 
or bad. Yet, according to the Compendium of Essence (Sārasaṅgaha), a collection 
of quotations by the thirteenth century Theravādin Siddhattha, “outcastes 
and fisherman who make their living by oppressing others” also qualify as 
worthy recipients of generous action (Heim 2004, 65). Insofar as those who 
live by oppressing others are neither virtuous nor good, there is some slight 
reason to favor the comparative interpretation of Subjective Superiority over the 
categorical interpretation.
Whatever its proper interpretation, Subjective Superiority is only a necessary 
condition for esteeming someone. It is not a sufficient condition. Just as a 
professional scientist might acknowledge their uneducated parents as superior 
in practical knowledge but inferior in scientific knowledge, a donor might 
encounter a recipient as superior in some virtues but inferior in others. The 
paradigmatic example is a layperson who acknowledges a monk as superior 
in their knowledge of Buddhist teachings and yet inferior owing to excessive 
greediness (or other misconduct). This sort of example motivates a second 
constraint on esteem. I label the constraint Selective Attention.
Selective Attention: Someone has esteem toward an individual only if they 
refrain from noticing the individual’s faults.
The Compendium of Essence relates a story that illustrates Selective Attention. 
Knowing of a layperson who desires to make a gift, the local monastery sends 
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a monk to receive the donation. The locals know that the monk is greedy. Yet, 
when the monk arrives, the layperson is reverential, honoring the monk and 
bestowing a generous gift. The monk later returns, seeking to borrow a shovel. 
The layperson lends the shovel, albeit rudely rather than reverentially. The 
layperson esteems the monk during the first encounter, attending to the monk 
as a representative of the saṅgha. During the second encounter, by contrast, the 
layperson attends to the monk’s greedy nature and thereby lacks esteem toward 
the monk.4 
Subjective Superiority and Selective Attention, as constraints on the nature 
of esteem, help to explain why generous actions always and only offer gifts. 
Were a donor to presume that a recipient would use their offering to benefit 
the donor, the donor would treat their offering as a transaction rather than 
a gift. For example, the donor might treat the offering as discharging a debt 
owed by the donor, or incurring a debt in the recipient for the donor’s future 
profit. Considering the recipient to be virtuous and good, while ignoring their 
faults, involves considering the recipient as well-positioned to use offerings for 
good purposes. Hence, in treating their offering as a transaction rather than 
a gift, the donor judges others to be less valuable beneficiaries of whatever 
efforts the recipient might undertake by virtue of the donor’s offering. But 
when, in comparing oneself to another, one judges oneself to be more valuable 
than others, one manifests conceit (P. māna). Conceit is an impediment to 
wholesome living (see Dhammasangaṇi III.5.1116; recited from Rhys Davids 1900, 
298–299). Insofar as generous action facilitates wholesome living, no generous 
action manifests conceit. It follows that the offerings of generous actions are 
gifts rather than transactions.5
Whether the Giving Constraint and the Esteem Constraint are jointly 
sufficient conditions for generous action depends upon whether certain further 
conditions, regarding the donor’s attitude toward their offering, are constraints 
on generous action or, instead, metrics for ranking the degree to which one 
generous action might be more generous than another generous action. Three 
such conditions are noteworthy. The first condition is Valued Giving.
Valued Giving: An individual gives a valued offering when, and insofar as, the 
same individual would value the offering as desirable were the individual to 
receive it.
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Miller endorses a similar condition as necessary for generous action, arguing 
that an action is generous only if “what is bestowed by the action is subjectively 
valued by the giver” (Miller 2018, 220). However, I remain uncertain whether the 
Pāli Buddhist tradition endorses Valued Giving.
De Silva quotes from an unnamed commentary on the Discourse with 
Kūṭadanta (Kūṭadanta Sutta, DN 5) that distinguishes two kinds of giver (P. 
dāyako) from the lordly giver (P. dānapti).6 
He who himself enjoys delicious things but gives to others what is not delicious 
is a donor who is a slave to the gifts he gives. He who gives things of the same 
quality as he himself enjoys is one who is like a friend of the gift. He who 
satisfies himself with whatever he can get but gives delicacies to others is a 
lordly giver, a senior and master of the gifts given. (De Silva 2013, 116)
Because the Pāli Buddhist tradition tends to treat generous action as conducive 
to liberation from vice, giving a gift to which one is enslaved seems to 
disqualify the giving from being generous. Because one who is not enslaved to 
their gift is either a friend to their gift or a lordly giver, and because those who 
are friends to their gifts or lordly givers would value their gift as desirable were 
they to receive it, it seems to follow that Valued Giving is necessary for generous 
action. There is, however, some reason to doubt that giving a gift to which one 
is enslaved disqualifies the giving from being generous. In the Questions of King 
Milinda (Milinda Pañha), a monk Nāgasena convinces Milinda that anything is 
suitable as a gift when a worthy recipient is present (Book 4, Chapter 8, Section 7; 
recited from Rhys Davids 1894, 120–122). 
And now, O king, tell me—is there anything in the world which should be 
withheld as a gift, and not bestowed, when one worthy of a gift, one to whom it 
is one’s duty to give, is there? […]
No, Sir. When faith arises in their hearts some give food to those worthy of 
gifts, and some give clothes, and some give bedding, and some give dwellings, 
and some give mats or robes …, and some give the kingdom itself, and some 
give away even their own life. (Rhys Davids 1894, 120–122)
Those living in extreme poverty might have available, as gifts, only offerings 
they do not themselves enjoy, by virtue of lacking any enjoyable possessions. 
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Such persons technically qualify as slaves to whatever gifts they might give. 
Since the Pāli Buddhist tradition treats them as capable of generous action 
nonetheless, the preceding commentary seems better interpreted as an effort to 
rank the degree to which generous actions are generous. 
There is a second noteworthy condition of uncertain relevance as a 
constraint for generous action. The second condition is Confident Giving.
Confident Giving: An individual gives an offering with confidence when, and 
insofar as, the individual is confident that their offering will facilitate good 
outcomes for the recipient.
The Discourse on Eight Individuals (among other discourses) ranks worthy 
recipients for generous action. The Discourse about Kassapa (among other 
discourses) recommends giving to those who are maximally worthy. This 
provides some evidence for treating Confident Giving as necessary for generous 
action. For if Confident Giving is necessary for generous action, then knowing 
who is more or less worthy, and giving to those ranked as more highly worthy, 
is important for ensuring that one’s giving-efforts are generous. However, 
the extension of worthiness to paradigmatically vicious persons, in the 
Compendium of Essence (and elsewhere), provides some evidence that Confident 
Giving is not necessary for generous action, because those who make their 
living by oppressing others are unlikely to change their ways upon receiving a 
gift. I remain unsure whether having esteem for those who make their living 
by oppressing others is compatible with believing that gifts to such persons 
are unlikely to facilitate good outcomes. If it is not, extending worthiness 
to paradigmatically vicious persons does not undermine the evidence for 
treating Confident Giving as a necessary condition for generous action. If it is, 
perhaps the correct conclusion is that generous action by one who gives with 
confidence is closer to being perfectly generous than generous action by one 
who lacks such confidence.
A third noteworthy condition provides some support for treating Confident 
Giving as a measure of the degree to which generous action is generous rather 
than as a necessary condition for generous action. The third condition is 
Responsive Giving.
Responsive Giving: An individual responsively gives an offering to a recipient 
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when the individual gives whatever the recipient requests.
The Questions of King Milinda comes close to explicitly endorsing Responsive 
Giving as a necessary condition for generous action. Nāgasena is discussing 
with King Milinda a case in which another king, Vessantara, gave away his 
beloved wife and children as slaves to a priest (Book 4, Chapter 8, Section 5; 
recited from Rhys Davids 1894, 118–119). Milinda maintains that Vessantara’s 
gift was excessive and cruel. Nāgasena responds that excessive giving is always 
good. He further responds that giving whatever the recipient requests, while 
substituting an alternative, is wrong.7
Insofar as generous action is always good, Nāgasena’s response to Milinda 
seems to suggest that Responsive Giving is a necessary condition for generous 
action. To the extent that individuals might be confident that a requested gift 
will facilitate bad outcomes for the recipient, it follows that Confident Giving is 
not a necessary condition for generous action. I hesitate to endorse this line of 
reasoning, however, because the Pāli Buddhist tradition depicts Vessantara as 
a paradigm of perfect generosity. Perhaps those capable of perfectly generous 
action always oblige requests for gifts. This does not entail, however, that those 
who are unable to enact perfectly generous action always oblige requests for 
gifts. Perhaps imperfectly generous persons sometimes decline requests from 
others, preferring instead to give only when confident that their offering will 
facilitate good outcomes for the recipient. Such a preference might indicate 
an imperfect disposition for generosity. Since, however, some generous actions 
involve giving to recipients who make no requests, it cannot indicate that 
generous actions require Responsive Giving.
This concludes the elaboration for my proposed account of generous action 
in the Pāli Buddhist tradition. I now proceed to compare the proposal to extant 
contemporary Anglophone alternatives.
Comparisons with Other Buddhist Accounts of Generous Action
Contemporary English-language scholarship on Buddhist ethics identifies 
several characteristics of generous action. According to Wright,
The attitude of the giver and the spirit of the gift are essential to the practice 
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of generosity. Calm and even-minded, the enlightened donor is not moved by 
anything but the welfare of human beings and the openness of heart entailed 
in noble giving. Therefore, no thought is given to the rewards or “fruit” that 
inevitably flow back to the donor from a genuine act of generosity. Although 
there will be rewards that are a natural consequence of an act of giving, focus 
on those “fruits” demean and undercut [sic] the act. (Wright 2009, 21)
According to Heim, “one should give out of high regard for a respected 
recipient, with a pleased mind and without ill will. A donor should give 
unquestioningly, cheerfully, and without looking for a weakness in the 
recipient” (Heim 2007, 196–197). According to Mackenzie,
The target or aim of generosity is the welfare of others, both mundane and 
spiritual. Generosity may involve giving material resources, protection, or 
healing to those in need.[…] Furthermore, the virtue of generosity is not just a 
matter of its aim; the mental state of the giver is central to the moral quality of 
the action. One must not only aim to benefit others, one must act from a spirit 
of generosity. The motivation of generosity involves the genuine desire to help, 
non-attachment to what one gives (including resources, time, or talents), and no 
expectation of reward. (MacKenzie 2018, 160–161)
These brief excerpts indicate that, from a Buddhist perspective, the one 
who enacts generous action, the donor, aims only to benefit others, and the 
donor pursues this aim by giving something to a recipient as a gift in a spirit 
of cheerful helpfulness. Because generous action, so understood, involves 
no expectation of reward or reciprocation, it is distinct from bartering and 
other economic transactions. Because generous action is unquestioning and 
insensitive to concerns about one’s just deserts, it is distinct from justice. Insofar 
as charity involves encountering recipients as needy or inferior, generous action 
is also distinct from charitable action.8 
Extant accounts of generous action in the Buddhist tradition succeed 
in demarcating generous action from bartering, just action, and charitable 
action. However, they do not identify characteristics of generous action that 
are distinctive for the Buddhist tradition. For example, Roberts and Wood 
maintain that generous action in the Christian tradition involves a donor 
giving a beneficial gift to a recipient spontaneously and in a spirit of gladness 
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(Roberts and Wood 2007, 286–289). Both Hunt and Miller offer similar accounts 
from a secular perspective, replacing reference to spontaneity and gladness 
with a requirement that the donor not give from a sense of obligation (Hunt 
1975; Miller 2018). Herzog and Price, similarly, define generous action as “giving 
good things freely to enhance the well-being of others” (Herzog and Price 2016, 
4). Neither Christian nor secular accounts of generous action endorse the 
Esteem Constraint, which requires that generous donors have esteem for the 
recipients of their gifts. The account I propose of generous action in the Pāli 
Buddhist tradition improves upon extant accounts by virtue of making explicit 
this particular constraint, to which I turn in the next section.9 
The Value of Generous Action
Extant accounts of generous action in the Buddhist tradition neglect the 
Esteem Constraint. This omission explains why these accounts ignore what 
is distinctive about the Pāli Buddhist approach to conceptualizing generous 
action. Extant accounts require, as an alternative constraint on generous action, 
that donors give with a pleased and cordial mind. Insofar as states of pleasant 
cordiality are valuable, this alternative focus helps to explain why generous 
actions are valuable.10  
The account I propose supports a similar explanation. Giving with a pleased 
and cordial mind is a consequence of giving with esteem, or so I shall argue. 
This explanation, however, raises a puzzle. Giving with esteem also tends to 
have, as a consequence, certain expectations associated with merit. The puzzle 
is that expecting merit seems to preclude giving without an expectation of 
reward. I shall argue, to the contrary, that expecting merit does no such thing. 
Before doing so, however, I explain why those who give with esteem have a 
pleased and cordial mind.
The Discourse on the Six Factors of Giving (Chaḷaṅgadāna Sutta, AN 6.37) 
characterizes those who enact generous actions as glad in anticipation of 
giving, confident while giving, uplifted after giving, and throughout free of 
greed and hate. 
Prior to giving one is joyful; while giving one settles the mind in trust;
after giving one is elated: this is success in the act of offering.
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When they are devoid of lust [greed] and hatred, devoid of delusion, 
without taints, self-controlled, living the spiritual life, the field for the offering 
is complete….
Having performed such a charitable deed with a mind free from miserliness, 
the wise person, rich in faith, is reborn in a happy, non-afflictive world. (Bodhi 
2012, 990)
The Pāli Buddhist tradition maintains that donors who give with esteem 
exhibit Selective Attention toward the recipient of their gift. By refraining from 
noticing the recipient’s faults, the donor feels neither anger, envy, nor jealousy 
toward the recipient. This absence of negative feeling supports Confident 
Giving, whereby the donor is confident that their offering will facilitate good 
outcomes for the recipient. It also permits positive feelings to arise, such as 
pleasure in giving and cordiality toward the recipient (Heim 2004, 47). 
The Pāli Buddhist tradition maintains that donors who give with esteem 
have a pleased and cordial mind partly by virtue of expecting merit for their 
generous action. In the Discourse on the Analysis of Gifts (Dakkhiṇa Vibhaṅga 
Sutta, MN 142), the Buddha correlates the worthiness of a gift’s recipient with 
the merit a donor can expect in return for their gift. The merit ranges from 
a hundred-fold return when giving to an animal to an immeasurable return 
when giving to one making progress toward the first stage of liberation (see also 
Adamek 2005, 139–140). 
Ānanda, by giving a gift to an animal, the offering may be expected to repay a 
hundredfold. By giving a gift to an immoral ordinary person, the offering may 
be expected to repay a thousandfold. By giving a gift to a virtuous ordinary 
person, the offering may be expected to repay a hundred-thousandfold. By 
giving a gift to one outside [the Dispensation] who is free from lust for sensual 
pleasures, the offering may be expected to repay a hundred-thousand times a 
hundred-thousandfold.
By giving a gift to one who has entered upon the way to the realisation of 
the fruit of stream-entry, the offering may be expected to repay incalculably, 
immeasurably. What, then, should be said about giving a gift to a stream-
enterer? What should be said about giving a gift to one who has entered upon 
the way to the realisation of the fruit of once-return…to a once-returner…
to one who has entered upon the way to the realisation of the fruit of non-
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return…to a non-returner…to one who has entered upon the way to the 
realisation of the fruit of arahantship…to an arahant…to a paccekabuddha? 
What should be said about giving a gift to a Tathāgata, accomplished and fully 
enlightened. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 1104)
Wright summarizes the sorts of meritorious reward a generous donor might 
expect. He notes that rewards include “a share in the well-being of society as 
a whole [or a] slightly enhanced personal capacity to give in the future” as well 
as a sort of investment in the future that bestows “a better rebirth in the next 
life” (Wright 2009, 26–27; see also Adamek 2005, 144–149). These rewards support 
pleasure in giving, because they are desirable outcomes for the donor. They 
also support cordiality toward the recipient of giving, because the recipient’s 
presence to the donor is a precondition for the donor acting in ways that earn 
their reward.
Expecting merit from generous action is puzzling. Since merit is a sort 
of reward, expecting merit from giving seems to preclude giving without 
an expectation of reward. This appearance, however, is deceptive. Insofar as 
generous giving neither incurs nor repays debt, it precludes expecting a reward 
from the recipients of gifts. This is consistent with expecting a reward from 
elsewhere, by virtue of the workings of karma. This second sort of expectation 
is the basis for the donor’s expectation of reward. The source of merit is the 
giving itself rather than the recipient of the giving. So long as the donor 
performs their giving in the right manner, with esteem toward the recipient, 
their generous action earns good karma as merit. The good karma might return 
in the form of a favorable rebirth. It might return, as well, within the donor’s 
lifetime as an ameliorating of hindrances such as greed and conceit. 
Consider once again, by way of example, Indra’s gift to Mahākassapa in 
the Discourse About Kassapa. Indra esteems Mahākassapa as a worthy disciple 
of the Buddha. He offers curried rice, which is a desirable, and valuable gift 
for someone like Mahākassapa, who is recovering from illness. In bestowing 
a gift that is likely to facilitate Mahākassapa’s health, Indra can expect his 
offering to support Mahākassapa’s efforts in developing the saṅgha. Insofar as 
the saṅgha helps to improve the lives of many others, Indra can be confident 
that his offering will facilitate good outcomes. Because a strong and vibrant 
saṅgha is likely to benefit Indra as well (through his associations with the saṅgha 
as a bodhisattva), and because Indra’s action helps to improve his own morality, 
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Indra also can expect his giving to return as a personal reward. Provided that 
esteem for Mahākassapa, rather than personal interest, motivates his giving, 
Indra’s expectation of reward does not violate the Pāli Buddhist tradition’s 
conditions for generous action.
Esteem and the Teaching of No-Self
Before proceeding to compare my proposed account of generous action 
in the Pāli Buddhist tradition to recent accounts of generous action from 
other philosophical traditions, I address an apparent tension, internal to Pāli 
Buddhism, between recommending generous action as virtuous, requiring that 
donors esteem the recipients of their generosity, and affirming that all sentient 
beings are empty of self. I do so by discussing, in turn, the teaching of no-self 
(P. anattā) in early Pāli discourses, the tension between this teaching and the 
proposed account of generous action, soteriological reasons for supposing that 
the tension is merely apparent, and a natural—albeit speculative—strategy for 
resolving the tension.
According to the Discourse on the Non-Self Characteristic (Anattalakkhaṇa 
Sutta, SN 22.59), none of the constituents associated with persons are self (P. 
atta). The Buddha argues that none of the constituents associated with persons 
are selves, because each is subject to dukkha and dissolution (see Bodhi 2000a, 
901–903). He thereby seems to conceptualize selves as loci of ownership and 
control, sources of sovereignty that are invulnerable to change and secure 
against undesirable influences from others.  However, the Buddha does not 
deny that there are selves. This abstention from pronouncing upon matters of 
ontology is a recurring theme in the Pāli Buddhist tradition. For example, in 
Vacchagotta’s Discourse on Fire (Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta, MN 72), the Buddha, when 
pressed to answer various questions about the cosmos and the soul, declines to 
affirm any possible answer. 
The speculative view that the world is not eternal...that the world is finite...that 
the world is infinite...that the soul and the body are the same...that the soul is 
one thing and the body another...that after death a Tathāgata exists...that after 
death a Tathāgata does not exist... that after death a Tathāgata both exists and 
does not exist...that after death a Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist 
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is a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a vacillation 
of views, a fetter of views. It is beset by suffering, by vexation, by despair, and 
by fever, and it does not lead to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to 
peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna. Seeing this danger, I 
do not take up any of these views.11 (Nāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 591–592)
Similarly, in the Shorter Discourse With Māluṅkyaputta (Cūḷamālunkya Sutta, MN 
63) the Buddha compares those who speculate about metaphysical matters to 
a man wondering about the qualities of a poison arrow lodged in his body, and 
he recommends attending to the removal of the arrow without regard to the 
arrow’s history and composition (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 533–536). 
There is, however, some evidence that the Pāli Buddhist tradition denies the 
existence of selves. For example, in the Discourse About Vajirā (Vajirā Sutta, SN 
5.10), the eminent nun Vajirā is meditating beneath a tree. Wondering about 
the source and fate of her existence as a sentient being (P. satta), Vajirā lapses 
in her concentration when the malevolent demon Māra intervenes. Vajirā 
vanquishes Māra by affirming that, in considering herself as a sentient being, 
she is mistaken. 
Why do you now assume ‘a [sentient] being?’ Māra, is that your speculative 
view? This is a heap of sheer formations. Here no [sentient] being is found. 
Just as, with an assemblage of parts, the word ‘chariot’ is used, so, when the 
aggregates exist, there is the convention ‘a [sentient] being.’ (Bodhi 2000a, 230)
Vajirā denies that she exists as a sentient being. Insofar as her insight 
generalizes and selves exists only if sentient beings exist, Vajirā thereby denies 
the existence of selves.12
Regardless of the Pāli Buddhist attitude toward the existence of selves, the 
tradition is clear that one ought to abstain from considering anything as a self. 
For example, in the Discourse on the Way to the Imperturbable (Āneñja-Sappāya 
Sutta, MN 106), the Buddha instructs his students to consider wilderness, roots 
of trees, and empty dwellings as “void of a self or of what belongs to a self ” 
(Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 871). Similarly, in the Discourse With Girimananda 
(Girimananda Sutta, AN 10.60), the Buddha instructs Ānanda to consider his 
bodily senses, body, mind, mental states, and external happenings as not self 
(Bodhi 2012, 1412). This recommendation, however, seems to conflict with the 
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Pāli Buddhist attitude toward generous action. 
According to the analysis I propose for generous action in the Pāli Buddhist 
tradition, when a donor performs a generous action, the donor esteems the 
recipient of their gift (Esteem Constraint). Esteeming a recipient of a gift involves 
considering the recipient as an individual who is worthy of the gift. Insofar 
as considering someone as an individual who is worthy of a gift requires 
considering the individual as a self, it follows that recommending generous 
action as virtuous entails recommending that donors consider others as selves. 
But this is precisely what the Pāli discourses recommend against doing. 
There is good reason to suppose that the tension between recommending 
generous action and endorsing the teaching of no-self is merely apparent. 
According to the Discourse on the Six Factors of Giving, generous actions are 
vehicles for ameliorating greed and hate in others. But they are also vehicles for 
ameliorating greed and hate in oneself. According to the Fire Sermon Discourse 
(Ādittapariyāya Sutta, SN 35.28), greed and hate are akin to burning fires (P. āditta) 
that sustain dukkha. 
Bhikkhus [monks], all is burning. And what, bhikkhus, is the all that is burning? 
The eye is burning, forms are burning, eye-consciousness is burning, eye-
contact is burning, and whatever feeling arises with eye-contact as condition-
whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant-that too is burning. 
Burning with what? Burning with the fire of lust [greed], with the fire of hatred, 
with the fire of delusion. (Bodhi 2000b, 1143)
In the Discourse on the Simile of the Quail (Laṭukikōpama Sutta, MN 66), the 
Buddha recommends generous action as a vehicle for extinguishing these fires. 
Speaking to the monk Udāyin, the Buddha contrasts those who are attached 
by greed to routine and meager things with those who are not.
Udāyin, there are certain misguided men here who, when told by me ‘Abandon 
this,’ say: ‘What, such a mere trifle, such a little thing as this? This recluse is 
much too exacting!’ And they do not abandon that and they show discourtesy 
towards me as well as towards those bhikkhus desirous of training. For them 
that thing becomes a strong, stout, tough, unrotting tether and a thick yoke....
So, too, Udāyin, there are certain clansmen here who, when told by me 
‘Abandon this’...abandon that and do not show discourtesy towards me or 
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towards those bhikkhus desirous of training. Having abandoned it, they live at 
ease, unruffled, subsisting on others’ gifts, with mind [as aloof ] as a wild deer’s. 
For them that thing becomes a feeble, weak, rotting, cordless tether. (Ñāṇamoli 
and Bodhi 1995, 553–554)
Generous actions, accordingly, are vehicles to ameliorate dukkha, and those 
who aim to ameliorate dukkha ought to perform generous actions. Yet the 
Pāli Buddhist tradition is also clear that those who aim to ameliorate dukkha 
also ought to abstain from considering anything as a self. For endorsing the 
existence of selves fuels the fire of delusion (P. moha), and this fire also sustains 
dukkha. Insofar as extinguishing one fire does not involve fueling or creating 
another, it follows that extinguishing greed and hate through generous action 
is consistent with extinguishing delusion through following the teaching of 
no-self.
Unfortunately, the Pāli Buddhist tradition offers no explicit approach 
to resolving the apparent tension between recommending generous action 
and endorsing the teaching of no-self. I speculate, on behalf of the tradition, 
that one way to resolve the tension is to deny that considering someone as 
an individual who is worthy of a gift requires considering the individual as a 
self. The Pāli Buddhist tradition seems to indicate that to consider someone 
as a self is to consider them as having ownership or control over themselves 
and their constituents. By contrast, following a recent analysis of biological 
individuality by Pradeu (2010), I propose that to consider someone as an 
individual is to consider them as having spatial and temporal boundaries that 
suffice well enough to distinguish them from their surroundings and to permit 
demonstrative reference (with phrases such as “this one here” or “that one there”). 
This proposal entails that considering someone as an individual does not 
require considering them as a self. For just as one might consider an individual 
cloud as distinct from other clouds in the sky without considering the cloud as 
owning or controlling its water vapors, and just as one might consider a school 
of tuna fish as an individual distinct from predatory sharks without considering 
the school itself as owning or controlling its constituent fish, donors might 
consider recipients of their giving as individuals who are distinct from others 
without considering the recipients as owning or controlling themselves.
One might object that considering someone as an individual without 
considering them as a self precludes considering them as worthy of receiving 
JONES • An Account of Generous Action and Esteem in Pāli Buddhism  215 
a gift. There are two ways to develop this objection. The first is to contend 
that considering something to be worthy requires considering it to be a self. 
There is good reason to suppose that the Pāli Buddhist tradition rejects this 
contention. In his analysis of early Buddhist ecology, Kabilsingh notes that 
the attitude of the Buddha and his followers to forests and trees “cannot be 
interpreted otherwise than as an appreciation of their spiritual worth and 
the desire by believers to conserve them” (Kabilsingh 1998, 59). Hrynkow 
notes, as well, that early Buddhists consistently consider trees to be worthy of 
conservation (Hrynkow 2017, 807). The same Buddhists likely also consider trees 
to be sentient and, perhaps, inhabited by divine spirits (Schmithausen 1991, 5–8).13 
But insofar as the concern to conserve trees derives from a concern to prevent 
harm, and insofar as selves would be invulnerable to harm were they to exist, 
neither trees nor the spirits within qualify as selves.
The second way to develop the preceding objection is to contend that 
receiving a gift involves coming to own the gift. Since ownership is impossible 
in the absence of a self, it follows that considering a recipient as a selfless 
individual precludes considering them as someone capable of receiving a 
gift. I offer two responses to this version of the objection. The first is that 
considering someone to be a worthy gift recipient does not require considering 
them to be capable of receiving the gift. For example, universities sometimes 
offer scholarships to potential students without regard for whether mitigating 
factors might prevent those students from accepting the scholarships. Similarly, 
a layperson might consider a monk to be worthy of receiving a donation of rice 
without also considering whether the monk has undertaken a period of fasting. 
The second response to the second version of the preceding objection is 
that, when properly understood, the teaching of no-self denies that receiving 
something from another involves coming to own it. The recommendation to 
abstain from considering anything to be a self derives from the teaching that 
everything arises in dependence upon others (P. paṭiccasamuppāda). For selves, as 
loci of ownership and control, are individuals whose fates do not depend upon 
others. Yet insofar as individuals always depend upon others, they lack power 
to keep whatever they might have.14 They receive from others without thereby 
owning what they receive. So, too, in the case of generous action. Beneficiaries 
of generous action receive gifts from donors, but they do not own those 
gifts. Hence, abstaining from considering others as selves does not preclude 
considering them as capable of receiving a gift, because abstaining from 
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considering others as selves is consistent with denying that gift giving involves 
transfer of ownership.
Cross-Cultural Connections
Miller concludes his (secular) analysis of generous action with a list of open 
questions for future research (Miller 2018, 243). For the sake of facilitating 
cross-cultural dialogue, I proceed to examine how the preceding account of 
generous action in the Pāli Buddhist tradition bears upon a selection of Miller’s 
questions. I focus on conceptual questions about generous action. In doing so, I 
overlook questions Miller asks about his own account, empirical research, and 
methodological issues. (These include, respectively, Miller’s first, second, and fourth 
questions, eighth and ninth questions, and tenth question.) I overlook, as well, one 
question the Pāli Buddhist tradition does not clearly address, or at least the 
answer to which is not apparent from the preceding analysis. (This is Miller’s 
fifth question: “What should be said about gifts in which what is given … is itself ill 
begotten?”) These restrictions narrow the field of questions from ten to three. 
Consider, first, Miller’s third question:
(iii)  Are there any requirements pertaining to recipients of acts of putative 
generosity—for instance, that they be disposed to welcome such acts?
The Pāli Buddhist account of generous action I propose imposes no conditions 
on the recipient of a donor’s offering. The account requires that the recipient 
be someone who, from the perspective of the donor, is worthy of receiving 
an offering. However, insofar as all sentient beings are worthy, this first 
requirement is best understood as pertaining to the donor’s subjective attitude 
rather than the recipient’s objective worthiness. In traditional Buddhist 
cultures, there tends to be an expectation that recipients put offerings received 
to good use. The standard rationale for this expectation is that it helps 
donors to have confidence that their offerings will facilitate good outcomes 
for recipients of their gifts. However, this expectation does not qualify as a 
requirement on generous action, because generous action (on the account I 
propose) requires donors to ignore faults in recipients that might interfere with 
the recipients putting offerings to good use.
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Consider, next, Miller’s sixth question:
(vi) Is a wholeheartedness requirement a plausible necessary condition, such 
that when acting from generosity, a person must not have conflicting 
motives to both help and not help?
Miller tentatively endorses Wallace’s answer to this question, according to 
which a generous person “gives freely, wanting to give, with no practice in the 
background that requires such giving” (Miller 2018, 243 no. 44; citing Wallace 
1978, 151). The Pāli Buddhist account of generous action I propose agrees only 
in part. Consider the Discourse About Kassapa. The requirement that Indra 
esteem Mahākassapa precludes Indra not wanting to help Mahākassapa. Yet 
the discourse also characterizes Indra as having a duty to make merit. Insofar 
as duties are binding, the practice of merit-making requires Indra to give to 
Mahākassapa. Yet the same discourse also conceptualizes the motivation for 
Indra’s generous action as his esteem for Mahākassapa rather than his desire 
to satisfy a duty. Indra invokes a duty to give in the context of explaining 
why his offering is permissible. This is consistent with Indra having, as his 
motive for giving, a desire to facilitate good outcomes for one who is a worthy 
recipient.     
Consider, lastly, Miller’s seventh question:
(vii)   What does cross-cultural analysis reveal about the plausibility of the 
account, and in general about the universality of various claims about 
generosity?
The Pāli Buddhist account of generous action I propose agrees with Miller’s 
account. Both accounts entail that generous action differs from bartering, just 
action, and charitable action. Both accounts entail, as well, that donors enacting 
generous action should aim only to benefit the recipients of their giving, that 
they should pursue this aim by giving something to a recipient as a gift in a 
spirit of cheerful helpfulness, and that their gift should be something they 
judge to be valuable. 
The account I propose differs from Miller’s in two noteworthy ways. First, 
the account I propose, but not Miller’s, denies that generous action must be 
supererogatory. Miller justifies his supererogation requirement with a brief 
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argument: “Gifts by their nature are not things one is required to bestow 
on a recipient. They are freely chosen, praiseworthy if bestowed, but not 
blameworthy if omitted” (Miller 2018, 227). I understand the Pāli Buddhist 
tradition to endorse an alternative analysis of gifts. This alternative analysis 
contrasts gifts with things one bestows on a recipient for the sake of receiving 
a reward or return. Miller cites Sanchez’s analysis of gifts, according to which 
one gives a gift only if “one’s giving does not depend on whether or not one 
receives anything in return for one’s gift” (Sanchez 2010, 443). Sanchez’s analysis 
does not support Miller’s supererogation requirement. Indra’s generous action 
in the Discourse About Kassapa is required by duty. Yet, insofar as his esteem for 
Mahākassapa, rather than his duty, motivates his giving, Indra’s giving does not 
depend upon receiving anything in return for his gift. Miller also mentions, 
as support for his supererogation requirement, two fictional case studies of 
his own devising. By stipulation, there is no requirement that the donors in 
Miller’s cases give to another (Miller 2018, 217–218). Yet the cases demonstrate, 
at best, that some generous actions are supererogatory. The case of Indra, from 
the Discourse About Kassapa, shows that generous actions required by duty need 
not have, as their motive, a sense of duty.
The second noteworthy way in which the account of generous action I 
propose differs from Miller’s account is its requirement that donors esteem the 
recipients of their giving. Approaches to generous action with Indic ancestry 
tend to endorse a similar requirement.15 Secular accounts, by contrast, tend 
to focus on connections between generous action and empathy for others 
(see Miller 2018, 226; Allen 2018, 29–30). Empathy is akin to esteem. Both 
involve responding in some way to another. The response in empathy involves 
coming to have an emotional state that is similar to another’s emotional state. 
The response in esteem, by contrast, involves coming to have a cognitive 
state that evaluates another as superior in virtue and goodness. Esteeming 
another does not require empathizing with them. Moreover, Indic traditions 
tend to associate empathy (or compassion) with charitable action rather than 
generous action.16 Empathy motivates charitable giving to the needy, by 
making the donor responsive to the plight of the needy. Esteem, by contrast, 
involves encountering those in need as worthy of offerings, not because they 
lack necessities, but because they possess worthiness. The significance of 
this difference, between accounts supposing that generous actions involve 
encountering others as lacking something valuable, and accounts supposing 
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that generous actions involve encountering others as having something 
valuable, is a topic I leave for further research.
Concluding Reflections
Despite the importance of generosity to Buddhist teachings, the Pāli Buddhist 
tradition offers no explicit account of generous action. I address this omission 
by proposing that, according to the Pāli Buddhist tradition, generous actions 
are instances of giving in which a donor esteems the recipient of their giving. 
I propose, as well, that esteeming someone involves (subjectively) encountering 
them as (objectively) superior in virtue and goodness while refraining from 
noticing their faults. These proposals demarcate generous action from bartering, 
just action, and charitable action. They also explain why generous donors, when 
giving, have pleased and cordial minds.
I support my proposals with textual evidence from Pāli Buddhist discourses. 
However, these proposals seem to conflict with teachings about merit and no-
self from other Pāli Buddhist discourses. Expecting merit from an action seems 
to preclude giving generously, without an expectation of reward. Esteeming 
others seems to require considering them as selves. I argue, to the contrary, that 
these appearances are deceptive. Performing a generous action is consistent 
with expecting merit from that action, provided the merit is expected to 
accrue from the workings of karma rather than from a recipient’s reciprocity. 
Esteeming the recipients of gifts is also consistent with not considering 
them as selves, provided the recipients and their gifts are considered to be 
dependently arisen. Accordingly, in addition to highlighting some ways 
in which the Pāli Buddhist conception of generous action differs from 
conceptions of generous action from other traditions, my proposed account of 
generous action reveals some of the subtle relations, within the Pāli Buddhist 
tradition, between teachings about generosity, merit and karma, no-self and 
dependent arising.
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1  In this paper I employ the following abbreviations: P. for Pali, Skt. for Sanskrit, and Ch. 
for Chinese.
2  For further discussion of esteem in Indian Buddhism, see Heim (2004, 45–53). The 
standard translation of the Chinese character for esteem, xin 信, is faith. However, 
in Buddhist contexts, esteem is consistent with, and perhaps requires, the exercise of 
discursive judgment for determining worthiness. See Gómez (2004, 278).
3  I qualify an individual’s encounter of another as subjective to allow that the individual 
need not be correct in their evaluation of the one being encountered. I qualify the 
evaluative content of an individual’s encounter of another as objective when the individual 
considers their evaluation to be more than a matter of preference or custom. 
4  For further discussion of this story, see Heim (2004, 50–51).
5  For further discussion of donor expectations in the context of generous action, see Heim 
(2004, 33–35).
6  For an English translation of the Discourse with Kūṭadanta, see Walshe (1995, 133–141).
7  The priest had requested the king’s family as a gift. Nāgasena denies that the king’s gift 
was cruel, because Vessantara knew that his father would ransom the family back from 
slavery (see Questions of King Milinda 4.8.17; recited from Rhys Davids 1894, 131). 
8  For further discussion in relation to Christian charity, see Heim (2004, 155 n. 77).
9  Heim (2004) and Heim (2007) connect esteem with Buddhist generosity. However, 
neither Heim (2004) nor Heim (2007) posit esteem as a necessary condition for generous 
action.
10  For a more comprehensive list of why the Pāli Buddhist tradition treats generous actions 
as valuable, see De Silva (2013, 123–127).
11  The Buddha’s responses to Vacchagota seem to be jointly inconsistent. For an analysis of 
the Buddha’s responses that removes this inconsistency, see Jones (2020).
12  For further discussion of Vajirā’s reasoning, see Jones (forthcoming).
13  When explaining why early Buddhist tradition prohibits monks from killing trees and 
other plants, Schmithausen notes, “one could add the idea that trees deserve gratitude for 
the service they render people, esp. offering shade and fruits.... This idea need not imply 
that the tree is actually regarded as a sentient being, but at least it is treated as if it were 
one, i.e., like a friend or partner” (Schmithausen 1991, 7 no. 38).
14  Rose makes the same point with more poetic language: “We are only temporary 
caretakers of all that is provided; essentially, we own nothing. As this understanding takes 
JONES • An Account of Generous Action and Esteem in Pāli Buddhism  221 
root in us, there is no getting, possessing, and giving; there is just the spaciousness that 
allows all things to remain in the natural flow of life” (Rose 2012, 12).
15  For details, see Heim (2004, 45–53).
16  For details, see Heim (2004, 76–78).
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